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ARTICLES
BIOETHICS TODAY, BIOETHICS TOMORROW:
STEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE
"DIGNITARIAN ALLIANCE"
ROGER BROWNSWORD*
INTRODUCTION
If we take bioethics seriously, then we will think that it is
right, indeed essential, to ask a question of the following kind:
which (if any) of the technologies now being developed in the
biosciences and biomedicine can be legitimately put into prac-
tice and with what limitations (if any)? We will think it worth
debating the ethical credentials of, say, human cloning (repro-
ductive and non-reproductive), gene therapy, pre-implantation
diagnosis, stem cell research, and so on. Even those who think
that there is little prospect of achieving a consensus on such
questions, or who think that there is something of an inevitability
about the advance of technology that promises to serve some per-
ceived human need, will concede some purpose to such ethical
reflections. For instance, in his recent book, Redesigning
Humans,1 Gregory Stock says:
We would do well to explore the arguments for and against
advanced reproductive technologies not with the extrava-
gant hope of resolving our differences, but with the mod-
est one of clarifying them. We will do well if we can figure
out how to come to grips with these differences and bal-
ance the opportunities and dangers the technologies
embody. The importance of our efforts does not lie in
whether we decide to allow such technologies; they will
* Professor of Law, University of Sheffield, England. I should make it
clear that, although I was one of the two specialist advisers to the House of
Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research, the views expressed in this
paper are my own. In no sense am I speaking for the Committee collectively or
for any of its members personally.
1. GREGORY STocK, REDESIGNING HuMANs (2002).
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arrive anyway. The point is how much they will rend our
society in the process.
2
Bioethics then, just like the law, must settle for something short
of regulatory omnipotence. Nevertheless, it is more than a side-
show; and, if the law is to be (bio)ethically informed, there are
questions to be asked about how we should proceed and by
which principles or values we should be guided.
Speaking some ten years ago, at a symposium on the chal-
lenges (both ethical and legal)' presented by the rapid develop-
ments in modem genetics, Baroness Mary Warnock suggested
that the general bioethical question might be put in more than
one way:
Technology has made all kinds of things possible that were
impossible, or unimaginable in an earlier age. Ought all
these things to be carried into practice? This is the most
general ethical question to be asked about genetic engi-
neering, whether of plants, animals or humans. The ques-
tion may itself take two forms: in the first place, we may ask
whether the benefits promised by the practice are out-
weighed by its possible harms. This is an ethical question
posed in strictly utilitarian form .... It entails looking into
the future, calculating probabilities, and of course evaluat-
ing outcomes. "Benefits" and "harm" are not self-evidently
identifiable values. Secondly we may ask whether, even if
the benefits of the practice seem to outweigh the dangers,
it nevertheless so outrages our sense of justice or of rights
or of human decency that it should be prohibited whatever
the advantages. 4
Generalising and simplifying this guidance, we might say that
bioethics is presented with a choice of basic approaches. One
approach, in line with utilitarianism, is to subject new develop-
ments (or proposed practices) to a harm-benefit assessment; if
that assessment indicates a balance of harm over benefit, we
should definitely not proceed (and the law should put in place
2. Id. at 129.
3. Should this be taken to imply a separation of the ethical and the legal,
let me note two correctives. First, as a conceptual matter, I would regard the
legal as a species of the moral (ethical). See Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brown-
sword, Law as a Moral Judgment vs. Law as the Rules of the Powerful, 28 Am. J. JuRIS.
79 (1983) (quoting DERYCK BEYLEVELD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT (Sheffield
Academic Press 1994) (1986)). Secondly, as an empirical matter, any positive
law that is out of line with general ethical commitments is unlikely to be
effective.
4. Baroness Mary Warnock, Philosophy and Ethics, in GENETIC ENGINEER-
ING-THE NEW CHALLENGE 67 (C. Cookson et al. eds., 1993).
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whatever prohibitions are appropriate); but if the assessment
indicates a balance of benefit over harm, then the particular
development or practice should be regarded as ethically clean
(and the law should take up a permissive position). Alternatively,
we should ask whether a new development (or proposed prac-
tice) "outrages our sense of justice or of rights or of human
decency.. . ."' If it does not, we should pronounce the particu-
lar development or practice ethically clean; but, if we are so out-
raged, we should reject the proposal even if it means that we will
have to forego certain perceived benefits. Such a bifurcation,
however, might seem to be too stark. On the utilitarian side,
there are important differences, for example, between those who
operate with short-term rather than medium-term or long-term
time-frames; and, on the non-utilitarian side, a number of quite
different deontological theories might find a home somewhere
in the realm of justice, rights, or human decency (each of which
is a recognisable department of the Kingdom of Ends). Moreo-
ver, are there not theoretical strategies for blending utilitarian
and deontological perspectives-for example, in the way that
some interpret the hugely influential value framework for bioeth-
ics constructed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress6-or
pluralistic approaches that belie any simple bifurcation between
utilitarian and deontological perspectives?
Allowing that bioethics is not bifurcated in quite such
straightforward terms, there is nevertheless something in the
idea that new technologies tend to provoke debates in which pro-
moters of the particular technology implicitly appeal to utilita-
rian considerations (especially on the benefit side of the
calculation) while their opponents invoke deontological criteria
of the kind represented by respect for justice, rights, or human
decency. Of course, where the harms associated with a technol-
ogy transparently outweigh any possible benefits, the proposal
will not get to first base-such is the case, for example, in the
current state of the art, with human reproductive cloning. How-
ever, if the technology improved to the point where reproductive
cloning in humans was perfectly safe and reliable, and where
there were no discernible "harms" to offset the "benefits" (such
as psychological harm in families), whatever opposition
remained would come from the side of those concerned with jus-
tice, rights, or human decency.
5. Id.
6. TOM L. BFAucHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1979). For an indication of the influence of
this work, see, for example, RAANAN GILLON, PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS
(1985).
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Now, while bioethics has been in its infancy, the overwhelm-
ing concern of the non-utilitarians has been to assert the impor-
tance of individual human rights, particularly individual rights to
autonomy and privacy. Watershed declarations, such as those at
Nuremburg and Helsinki, underline that the rights of individuals
must not be subordinated to the supposed advance of science or
medicine or to the interests of society; and, in both research and
clinical settings, the importance of informed consent (reflecting
the right of autonomous choice) has been loudly proclaimed. 7
For those who have grown up to take bioethics seriously, it will be
natural enough to think that we should also take rights seriously.
And, if we think that respect for human rights follows from
respect for human dignity, then we will go back to this
dignitarian premise when we make our last stand against the util-
itarians. This leads us to the principal claim in this paper which
is that the configuration of bioethics is undergoing a significant
change; specifically, that, in place of a two-sided contest between
utilitarian and human rights perspectives, we are moving towards
a three-cornered contest in which these founding protagonists
are joined by a new "dignitarian alliance." When the human
rights perspective is underpinned by the principle of respect for
human dignity, it might seem to be inappropriate to use the lan-
guage of human dignity to describe this new alliance on the bio-
ethical block. However, no other term will do; for, quite simply,
the protection of human dignity is the unifying value within the
alliance.
In Part I of the paper, I will sketch two accounts of human
dignity, so to speak, two deontologies of human dignity. Whilst
one account (human dignity as empowerment) underlies the
human rights perspective, which has been so important in the
formative years of bioethics, the other (human dignity as con-
straint) is the gathering point for the dignitarian alliance. The
reason why the latter is an important entrant into the bioethical
arena is that it challenges the wisdom of both utilitarianism and
dignity-based human rights. Expressing the third perspective in
communitarian terms, we would say that human dignity is a good
which must not be compromised by our actions or practices and
that any action or practice that compromises the good is unethi-
cal irrespective of welfare-maximising consequences (contrary to
utilitarianism) and regardless of the informed consent of the par-
ticipants (contrary to human rights thinking). Thus, even if, say,
human reproductive cloning could be supported by utilitarians
7. See, e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & Tom BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
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and tolerated by human rights theorists, the dignitarian alliance
might yet contend that this is off limits as compromising human
dignity.
Perhaps the emergence of the dignitarian alliance owes
something, as Gregory Stock puts it, to "European sensitivities, ''
in which case it might be credible only within certain bioethical
circles. Moreover, so long as bioethics is a secular discipline, this
particular articulation of human dignity might yet fall away as
quickly as it has asserted itself. After all, it is a mere thirty years
since philosophers could write that human dignity "seems to
have suffered the fate of notions such as virtue and honor, by
simply fading into the past."9 Nevertheless, there are at least two
reasons for thinking otherwise. One reason is that neither utilita-
rian nor human rights perspectives give much support to the
interests of conservatism, constancy, and stability. When human
dignity as the underpinning of human rights has acted as such a
dynamic and progressive force for change, it might seem incon-
gruous to enlist this same idea in defence of the status quo. Yet,
as the pace of biotechnology accelerates, we should not under-
rate the felt need to find a way of registering our concern that we
should at least have the opportunity to hang on to those parts of
the human condition that are familiar and reassuringly "human."
Rather obviously, the notion of "human dignity" fits this particu-
lar bill. The other reason for thinking that the dignitarian alli-
ance might be in for the longer run is that there are some forms
of biotechnology that impact directly on humans but which are
not readily engaged by the human rights perspective. One such
example is research on human embryos; and, not surprisingly,
therefore, we find the dignitarian alliance pitted against the utili-
tarians in the debates about stem cell research that are now
reverberating around the world.
In Part II of the paper, I will focus specifically on the debate
about human embryonic stem cell research that has recently
taken place in the United Kingdom, culminating in a Report
from a specially constituted House of Lords Select Committee. °
Broadly speaking, the Select Committee endorsed the Govern-
ment's approach to the regulated facilitation of stem cell
research; and, not surprisingly, the Government has recently
8. See STOCK, supra note 1, at 13.
9. Michael Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299, 299
(1972).
10. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMM., REPORT ON STEM CELL RESEARCH,
H.L. PAPER 83(i) (Report), and 83(ii) (Evidence) (London: HMSO, Feb. 27,
2002) [hereinafter STEM CELL REPORT].
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responded to the Report in positive terms.'' In the event, the
United Kingdom now has an explicitly permissive legal frame-
work for licensing human embryonic stem cell research backed
by a government that is committed to supporting the biosciences
and by a broad band of public and bioethical opinion. Indeed,
were it not for the emergence of the dignitarian alliance, it
would be difficult for opponents of these permissive moves to
find a peg on which to hang their objections.
I. Two ACCOUNTS OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Human dignity is an elusive concept, used in many senses by
moral and political philosophers.' 2 In bioethical debates as they
are now shaping up, however, it is an idea that appears in two
very different roles, in the one case acting in support of individual
autonomy (human dignity as empowerment) and, in the other
case, acting as a constraint on autonomy (human dignity as con-
straint) .13 For instance, in debates about "death with dignity," we
find the need to respect human dignity being voiced on both
sides of the argument, both by those who advocate more permis-
sive legal frameworks as well as by those who oppose any relaxa-
tion in the law. As Mohammed Bedjaoui, President of the
International Court of Justice, has commented:
[A] legal framework for potential new practices or those
already engaged in which concern the human body is abso-
lutely essential in that it protects man in his freedom and
dignity. But it is by no means an easy task ....
Take, for example, the concept of. . . "human dignity." It
is an expression which seems simple: one immediately
apprehends its prospective import, if not its exact mean-
ing. But, paradoxically, it is also an expression full of fra-
gility, for in the name of the same argument of "human
dignity" some refute the legitimacy of euthanasia, whilst
others claim it as the ultimate right of those who wish to
"die in dignity"!1 4
We can try to disentangle and clarify these two approaches to
human dignity by taking one step at a time. First, we can identify
11. DEP'T OF HEALTH, GOvERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS
SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON STEM CELL RESEARCH, 2002, Cm. 5561.
12. See RONALD DwoRIuN, LIFE'S DOMINION 233-37 (1993).
13. The terminology here comes from DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER
BROWNSwORD, HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND BioLAw (2001).
14. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Address Before the International Bioethics
Committee of UNESCO (Sept. 1995), in U.N. ESCOR Int'l Bioethics Comm.,
3d Sess., vol. I, at 137, 144, U.N. Doc. DRG.96/WS/8 (1995).
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the salient features of human dignity as empowerment; secondly,
we can do the same with human dignity as constraint; thirdly we
can point to the contrast between human dignity, on the one
hand, as a distinctive characteristic of individual persons that
speaks to their moral entitlement and obligation and, on the
other hand, as a collective good to be respected by a community;
fourthly, we can illustrate the obvious tension between these
approaches by discussing the French dwarf-throwing case (lancer
de nain); and, fifthly, before returning these approaches to the
larger bioethical scene, we can consider the possibility of a
degree of concord between the two deontologies.
A. Human Dignity as Empowerment
The conception of human dignity as empowerment is very
closely linked with modern human rights thinking. In particular,
human dignity is explicitly declared to be one of the founda-
tional ideas in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948), and its partner Covenants on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (1966), and on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
Thus, the Preamble to each of these instruments provides that
"recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalien-
able rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world[;]"' 5 and Article 1 of
the Universal Declaration famously proclaims that "[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."' 6 That is
to say, each and every human being has inherent dignity; it is this
inherent dignity that grounds (or accounts for) the possession of
inalienable human rights; and, because all humans have dignity,
they hold rights equally. So understood, the injunction to
respect human dignity is much more than a demand that we
commonly make in contexts where we detect demeaning or
degrading treatment, or where we are trying to give weight to an
interest in privacy, it is the infrastructure on which the entire
superstructure of human rights is constructed.1
7
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., preamble, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Dec-
laration]; Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at
preamble (opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976);
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at preamble (opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
16. Universal Declaration, supra note 15, art. 1.
17. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HuMtAN RiGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 143-49
nn.22-39 (1993), for examples of the recurrent use of human dignity in inter-
national human rights declarations, covenants, conventions, and resolutions.
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If the inherent dignity of humans is the justifying reason for
the possession of human rights, what is it precisely that dignity
connotes? To say that humans have dignity, meaning that
humans have a value, simply by virtue of being members of the
human species will not convince even fellow humans. For, any
attempt to privilege the members of a particular species, includ-
ing the members of the human species, merely by virtue of their
species-membership will attract the charge of "speciesism"-such
a response is arbitrary and it plainly will not do. If humans have
a value, it must be for a better reason than this. But, if our ethics
is strictly secular, what better reason can we offer? The English
bioethicist, John Harris, has famously suggested that humans qua
persons are distinctive in having the capacity to value their own
existence.' 8 This implies the following linkage between dignity
as the basis of rights and, say, the right to life:
(i) Each person has dignity in the sense that he or she
has the capacity to make a judgment about the value
of his or her existence.
(ii) Exercising this capacity (as it were, expressing this
dignity), at any particular time, he or she will have a
view about whether life is preferable to death.
(iii) In order to respect the will or the preferences of such
persons, we must respect the human right to life
(meaning that we should not terminate human life
where this would be contrary to the will or preference
of the person concerned).
Writing about euthanasia, Harris generalises this in the language
of autonomy:
The point of autonomy, the point of choosing and having
the freedom to choose between competing conceptions of
how, and indeed why, to live, is simply that it is only thus
that our lives become in any real sense our own. The value
of our lives is the value we give to our lives. And we do this,
so far as this is possible at all, by shaping our lives for our-
selves. Our own choices, decisions and preferences help to
make us what we are, for each helps us to confirm and
modify our own character and enables us to develop and to
understand ourselves. So autonomy, as the ability and the
freedom to make the choices that shape our lives, is quite
crucial in giving to each life its own special and peculiar
value.1
9
18. See, e.g., JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE (1985).
19. John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, in EUTHANAsIA EXAMINED
6, 11 (John Keown ed., 1995).
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With this kind of momentum, we can move rapidly from the
underlying idea of respect for human dignity to the familiar
claims made for autonomy and informed choice. Nevertheless,
all is not well. Humans, let us concede, are different from rocks
and stones; humans have the capacity to value their existence;
they have preferences; and they have the capacity to make free
and informed choices. When we are throwing pebbles on a
beach, we need not worry whether we are acting against their
preferences or interfering with their purposes, because quite sim-
ply they have none. When we hurl humans around, though, we
might well be so interfering; and, if hurling gets to the point of
being life-threatening, we might be jeopardising the very exis-
tence of these persons (when the continuation of their existence
is something that they value). So, dignity, in the sense of such
capacities, distinguishes humans from inanimate objects and,
quite probably, from most other non-human living things. How-
ever, we are still some way short of seeing how human dignity
justifies human rights in anything more than a limited way.
If the reason why I have a set of rights that (in the name of
autonomy) protects my choices is because I have human dignity,
and if human dignity simply refers to my capacity to make my
own choices, then the form of this justification seems to be that if
I have the capacity to do x, and I want to do x, then I have the
right to do x. Fairly obviously, though, this does not look very
promising-for, if this form of justification is valid, my capacity
to do x, where x signifies my capacity (say) to kick or kill those
whom I dislike (rather than my capacity to make my own deci-
sions), entails a right to do so. A better bet perhaps is to say that,
if we have the capacity to make our own choices, and if we value
exercising that capacity, then human rights centred on the pro-
tection of autonomy fit the bill. Or, to put this slightly differ-
ently, if our disposition is to make our own choices then we will
prefer a politico-legal framework that is geared towards respect-
ing autonomous decision-makers and their decisions, which,
broadly speaking, is precisely what human rights regimes aspire
to do.
Let us suppose that there is a symbiosis between human dig-
nity as empowerment and human rights such that, if we accept that
human dignity should be respected, it follows that we should
accept human rights. The former makes a triple underlying
demand: that one's capacity for making one's own choices
should be recognised; that the choices one freely makes should
be respected; and that the need for a supportive context for
autonomous decision-making should be appreciated and acted
upon. The latter then translates these underlying demands into
2003]
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entitlements that are due to each human as of right. Neverthe-
less, no matter how many times we repeat the mantra that human
rights are based on human dignity, the latter is not yet a com-
plete justification for the former and our problems are far from
over. In particular, this model of human dignity is vulnerable in
two respects.
First, the more that we emphasise that human dignity relates
to the capacity to make one's own decisions or one's own
informed choices or the like, the less compelling it becomes to
present the rights built on this base as human rights. If the para-
digm within this approach is a human with the relevant capacities
in a developed form, including the capacity to operate the rights
constructed on the dignity base, then many born humans (young
and old alike) will be excluded; and the unborn will also be
excluded. This does not mean that human dignity as empower-
ment has no resource to protect the interests of such excluded
humans but the protection cannot be in the form of a direct
right. In other words, any protective argument will have to be
constructed indirectly and any "rights" held will be enjoyed only
in a secondary sense.
Secondly, if human dignity justifies human rights only if we
accept that the decision-making capacity of others should be respected,
there is no answer to the amoralist who sees no reason, period,
why favourable account should be taken of the interests of
others. What can we say to the amoralist? To be sure, we can
appeal to the amoralist's prudential interests, pointing out that
we are alike in relevant respects; that we each have the capacity
and desire to make our own choices and so on; and that there
has to be mutual respect and some degree of co-operation other-
wise a context for autonomous life will not be viable and availa-
ble to either of us. However, although this might be true and
persuasive in many places at many times, it is hardly an argument
that meets the standards of rational necessity."z If we are to
make any progress with this philosophical challenge, we need to
fix on the internal logic of being an agent.2" The amoralist can
20. But, for a particularly interesting argument running from self-inter-
ested longer term utility to moral reason, see DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT (1986).
21. By an agent, I simply mean a being (whether human, modified
human, or definitely non-human) having the developed capacity for free and
purposive action. If we can believe anything, we can believe that adult humans
generally fit this description but, in principle, the category of agency might be
instantiated by others (provided that they are beings with the relevant capaci-
ties). It is the capacity for free and purposive action, for making one's own
independent decisions and choices, that equates to the dignity of agents (and
humans insofar as they are agents).
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hardly deny being an agent because, ex hypothesi, a choice has
been made to disengage from, or disbelieve in, the moral stand-
point and the moral life. Elsewhere, relying on the work of the
Chicago moral philosopher, Alan Gewirth, I have suggested that
agency does entail moral reason and, with that, an obligation to
take favourable account of the essential interests of fellow
agents.22 This is not the place to rehearse these complex and
contested arguments. Suffice it to say that, in my view, if human
dignity as empowerment is to justify a set of rights of the kind
associated with human rights, its best chance of doing so is by
changing the base to agency rather than humanity and then fol-
lowing the Gewirthian line of argument from agency.23
B. Human Dignity as Constraint
Philippe S6guin, President of the National Assembly of the
French Republic, remarked in the mid-1990s that the trend
towards the enactment of bioethics laws (such as the three
French Acts on bioethics of July 1994), "illustrates a growing
awareness around the world that legislators must, despite the dif-
ficulties, act to ensure that science develops with respect for human
dignity and fundamental human rights, and in line with national
democratic traditions."24
This trend is further illustrated by, for example, the Pream-
ble to the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine,25 which requires its signatories to resolve "to
take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity
and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with
regard to the application of biology and medicine. '26 Similarly,
22. Seminally, see ALAN CEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALrrv (1978); and for
my own reliance on Gewirthian theory, see, for example, Beyleveld & Brown-
sword, supra note 3, at 79.
23. For Gewirth's own most explicit account of the relationship between
human dignity and his argument from agency, see Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity
as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 10 (Michael J. Meyer &
William A. Parent eds., 1992).
24. Philippe Seguin, Address Before the International Bioethics Commit-
tee (Sept. 1995), in U.N. ESCOR Int'l Bioethics Comm., 3d Sess., vol. I, at 119,
U.N. Doc. DRG.96/WS/8 (1995).
25. This Convention is sometimes referred to as "the Bioethics Conven-
tion." Its full title is Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dig-
nity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1051, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListe
Traites.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Pol-
icy) [hereinafter Bioethics Convention].
26. Id. at Preamble.
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the Preamble to UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the
Human Genome and Human Rights, 2 7 states that while
research on the human genome and the resulting applica-
tions open up vast prospects for progress in improving the
health of individuals and of humankind as a whole... [it is
imperative] . . . that such research should fully respect
human dignity, freedom and human rights.
28
Even in the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechno-
logical Inventions29 (which deals inter alia with the vexed ques-
tion of the patentability of biological material, including copies
of human gene sequences), the need for patent law to respect
dignity is emphasised-Recital 16, for example, proclaiming that
"patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental
principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the
person."3 °
Insofar as these ringing declarations in favour of human dig-
nity simply reinforce the demand that human rights should be
respected, they say little that is new. However, it is in these most
recent appeals to human dignity that we find the new turn in the
rhetoric of bioethics, specifically by reliance on human dignity as
constraint.
In modern European bioethics, human dignity is articulated
in a way that appeals to a coalition of Kantians, Catholics, and
communitarians. 3 1 In fact, both interpretations-human dignity
as empowerment and human dignity as constraint-can claim to
27. U.N. ESCO's Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and
Human Rights, Nov. 11, 1997 [hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights]. This
Declaration, adopted unanimously at the 29th Session of the General Confer-
ence on November 11, 1997, was the result of more than four years' work car-
ried out by the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO. On December
9, 1998, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/53/
152 endorsing the Declaration. See G.A. Res. 53/152, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (1998).
28. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 27.
29. Council Directive 98/44, art. 189b; 1998 O.J. (L 213), 30.7.98, 213.
30. Id. Recital 16; see also id. Recital 38, which provides:
Whereas the operative part of this Directive should also include an
illustrative list of inventions excluded from patentability so as to pro-
vide national courts and patent offices with a general guide to inter-
preting the reference to ordre public and morality; whereas this list
obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive; whereas processes, the
uses of which offend against human dignity, such as processes to pro-
duce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and ani-
mals, are obviously also excluded from patentability.
Id.
31. See generally 1 JACOB RENDTORFF & PETER KEMP, BASIC ETHICAL PRINCI-
PLES IN EUROPEAN BIOETHICS AND BIoLAw (1999).
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be rooted in the seminal writing of Immanuel Kant. For, in
Kant's work, we find not only the idea that humans have intrinsic
dignity (which suggests a conception of human dignity as
empowerment, albeit duty-driven rather than rights-driven) 32 but
also that human dignity has no price and that humans owe them-
selves a duty of self-esteem (which might suggest a conception of
human dignity as constraint). In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
collects together the strands of his thinking as follows:
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from
his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect
every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human
being cannot be used merely as a means by any human
being... but must always be used at the same time as an
end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists,
by which he raises himself above all other beings in the
world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and
so over all things. But just as he cannot give himself away
for any price (this would conflict with his duty of self-
esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally nec-
essary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is
under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the
dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence
there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must
be shown to every other human being.33
In these much-quoted remarks, modern writers can (and do pur-
port to) find support for a variety of supposed applications of
Kantian morality, not just in practical matters generally, but spe-
cifically within the fields of bio-science and bio-commerce.3 4 For,
Kant's remarks, if taken literally, are an open invitation to claim
that commercialisation of the human body is an affront to dig-
nity (by putting a price on something that is beyond price).
However, commodification of the human body-whether in
the form of commerce in human organs or tissue, prostitution,
surrogacy for profit, or patenting human genes-is just one of a
number of practices that are regularly cited as instances of
human dignity being compromised. Typically, human dignity as
constraint also condemns sex selection and positive (eugenic)
32. For the significance of this distinction, see Deryck Beyleveld & Roger
Brownsword, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics, in HuMAN
GENETICS AND THE LAW: REGULATING A REVOLUTION 69 (Roger Brownsword et
al. eds., 1998), and BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 13.
33. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs 209 (Mary Gregor ed.,
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
34. See, e.g., Werner Wolbert, The Kantian Formula of Human Dignity and its
Implications for Bioethics, 4 HUM. REPROD. & GENETIC ETHICS 18 (1998).
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gene selection, germ-line gene therapy, embryo research and
abortion, euthanasia and assisted suicide, genetic discrimination,
and (perhaps top of its current list) human reproductive cloning.
The list, though, is hardly closed; and there surely will be addi-
tions as technology opens up new bio-options and opportunities.
If we think that human dignity as empowerment might have
some difficulty with the amoralist, the same is true of human dig-
nity as constraint. Putting non-secular arguments to one side,
the dignitarian alliance effectively has only two moves that it can
make. One move is to resurrect the Kantian transcendental argu-
ment for the categorical imperative. If this works, we arrive at a
duty-driven moral theory, including duties to the self, which is
centred on rational beings with a will as paradigmatic moral sub-
jects." The amoralist, especially if a professional philosopher, is
unlikely to be impressed. The other move is to declare the con-
straints as the entry conditions for group membership-but the
snag with this is that the amoralist is not interested in joining
anyway.
C. Two Reference Points for Human Dignity
When we order our thinking about human dignity, we can
fix on two different reference points. One reference point is the
idea that human dignity speaks to what is special or specific
about humans, that is to say, what is intrinsically and universally
distinctive about humans. As Francis Fukuyama has recently put
it, the demand made in the name of human dignity is one for
equal recognition which implies "that when we strip all of a per-
son's contingent and accidental characteristics away, there
remains some essential human quality underneath that is worthy
of a certain minimum level of respect . . . . " This reference
point is to be contrasted with the idea that human dignity speaks
less to what is special about humans qua humans and more to
what is special about a particular community's idea of civilised
life and the concomitant commitments of its members. Here,
appeals to human dignity draw on what is distinctively valued
concerning human social existence in a particular community-
indeed, on the values and vision that distinguish the community
35. By limiting moral agency to a particular class of humans (rational
beings with a will) rather than humans as such, this view runs into the same
difficulty as "human dignity as empowerment."
36. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 149 (2002). According
to Fukuyama, although "many would list human reason and human moral
choice as the most important unique human characteristics that give our spe-
cies dignity, [Fukuyama] would argue that possession of the full human emo-
tional gamut is at least as important, if not more so." Id. at 169.
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as the particular community that it is and relative to which the
community's members take their collective and individual iden-
tity. In principle, each starting point has the scope for both
human dignity as empowerment as well as human dignity as con-
straint. In practice, though, whereas the former tends to be
closely associated with human rights movements aimed at giving
individuals the opportunity to flourish as self-determining
authors of their own destinies, the latter (as expressed by the
dignitarian alliance) combines a (Kantian) view of what is distinc-
tive about humans (their dignity) with views about what defines
life as civilised (and, thus, respectful of human dignity) in a par-
ticular community.
D. The Tension Between the Rival Approaches:
The Case of the French Dwarfs
We do not need to look very long to find examples of the
potential tension between human dignity as empowerment and
human dignity as constraint." For instance, in the famous
French dwarf-throwing ("lancer de nain") case,3" the Conseil
d'Etat, having affirmed that respect for human dignity is one of
the constituents of ordre public, confirmed a municipal police
power to prohibit any spectacle that represented a threat to such
respect. Accordingly, it was held that, where police powers had
been exercised in Morsang-sur-Orge and Aix-en-Provence to ban
dwarf-throwing in local clubs, such steps were lawfully taken in
order to secure respect for human dignity and ordre public.
However, the legality of the bans was challenged by, among
others, one of the dwarfs, who argued that he freely participated
in the activity, that the work brought him a monthly wage (as well
37. Compare David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part I, 16
Pub. L. 682, 685 (1999) (Eng.), where it is rightly observed that human dignity
can cut both ways:
[W]e must not assume that the idea of dignity is inextricably linked to
a liberal-individualist view of human beings as people whose life-
choices deserve respect. If the state takes a particular view on what is
required for people to live dignified lives, it may introduce regulations
to restrict the freedom which people have to make choices which, in
the state's view, interfere with the dignity of the individual, a social
group or the human race as a whole .... The quest for human dignity
may subvert rather than enhance choice .... Once it becomes a tool
in the hands of lawmakers and judges, the concept of human dignity is
a two-edged sword.
Id.
38. Ville d'Aix-en-Provence, 1996 Dalloz 177 (Conseil d'Etat) (with annota-
tion by Gilles Lebreton); Cne de Morsang-sur-Orge, 1995 Dalloz 257 (Conseil
d'Etat).
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as allowing him to move in professional circles) and that, if
dwarf-throwing was banned, he would find himself unemployed
again. To this, the Conseil d'Etat responded that the dwarf com-
promised his own dignity by allowing himself to be used as a pro-
jectile, as a mere thing, and that no such concession could be
allowed.39
On the one side, the dwarfs were relying on the conception
of human dignity as empowerment. For the dwarfs, the central
issue was whether others were acting against their (the dwarfs')
will. Their argument was that they were not being treated as
mere things; others were not disregarding their capacity to con-
trol the situation. It was only to the extent that the dwarfs freely
chose to participate that the activities took place. Moreover,
from the dwarfs' viewpoint, to be deprived of their status as
employed persons was to undermine the conditions in which
they experienced a sense of their own dignity. So interpreted, it
was the well-meaning paternalism of the Conseil, rather than the
actions of the dwarf-throwers, that represented a threat to the
dignity of the dwarfs.
On the other side, the Conseil d'Etat was operating with a
conception of human dignity as constraint. Central to this con-
ception is the idea that the dwarfs might compromise their own
dignity and/or, with that, the dignity of fellow humans as under-
stood in contemporary France. This is the idea of human dignity
as an overriding value (whether grounded in individual humans
or in groups of humans), a value to be respected by all members
of human society. On this view, the fact that the dwarf-throwers
did not intend to demean or degrade the dwarfs, or that the
dwarfs freely consented to their participation, is immaterial:
ordre public (including respect for human dignity) sets limits to
autonomy-certain expressions of free choice are, quite simply,
out of bounds. As for undermining the conditions in which the
dwarfs recovered a sense of self-esteem, presumably the Conseil
judged.that this must be a case of false consciousness; for, surely,
no authentic sense of self-esteem could be derived from partici-
pation in dwarf-throwing when the activity could not stand along-
side respect for human dignity.
39. See Marie-Christine Rouault, L interdiction Par un Maire de L 'attraction
Dite de Lancer de Nain, 11 LES PETrrEs AFFiCHES 30, 32 (Jan. 24, 1996). For reflec-
tions on the case, with dignity being interpreted as the essence of humanity, see
B. Edelman, La Dignite de la Personne Humaine, un Concept Nouveau, RECUEIL DAL-
LOZ, 23e CAMIER, CHRONIQUE, 185, 187-88 (1997).
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E. Might There Be a Concord?
Human dignity as empowerment protects the making of
choices. Exercising their dignity, in this sense, autonomous
agents may decide upon a policy of individual or group restraint.
They may choose, for example, not to take advantage of some or
all of the available biotechnologies. Equally, they may decide
that, say, dwarf-throwing, bull-fighting, and fox-hunting are not
to their taste and they may agree that such "sports" should not be
permitted in the zones over which they have control. If the zone
in question amounts to a nation state, then the process by which
such a choice is expressed and the terms on which majority
choices can bind minority dissenters must be compliant with an
autonomy-centred framework of human rights.
If a community guided by human dignity as empowerment
makes choices that mimic another community's understanding
of the requirements of human dignity as constraint, there will be
some degree of practical correspondence between the bioethical
standards that are accepted and applied in each society. For
example, in both societies, it might be accepted that no steps
should be taken to screen embryos in order to select for a desira-
ble genetic make-up. Despite such surface similarity, however,
there is a fundamental difference between these two communi-
ties. In the community guided by human dignity as empower-
ment, the background belief is that, other things being equal,
screening embryos is ethically permissible and that a choice to
screen is no more or less right than a choice not to screen, and
vice versa. The fact that this particular community has elected
not to screen is a particular expression of the dignity of its mem-
bers for the time being, but it is a reversible decision. On at least
three points, the background belief system of the community
guided by human dignity as constraint is radically different.
First, the function of human dignity is not to emphasise the avail-
ability of choice but the fact that, where human dignity comes
into play, there is no choice-the conduct in question is not
optional. Secondly, if human dignity dictates that embryos
should not be screened, then those communities that permit
screening have either misinterpreted what human dignity
requires or (as in the empowerment communities) made a fun-
damental error as to the function and place of human dignity.
In both cases, human dignity is being compromised. Thirdly, the
standards set by human dignity are not reversible; the whole
point is that human dignity constrains autonomy.
Allowing that there may be an occasional correspondence
between communities that adhere to these different approaches
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to human dignity, is there not also a deeper similarity in that it is
"acceptance" that ultimately holds a particular approach in
place? Certainly, if we reject the possibility of either approach
being demonstrated to be correct as a matter of rational necessity
(of the kind that Gewirthians on the one side and Kantians on
the other might argue for), we are left with acceptance as the
epistemological baseline. In the community guided by human
dignity as empowerment, it is accepted that the capacity for indi-
vidual choice matters and that it should be respected where this
is compatible with respect for the like capacities of others. By
contrast, in the community guided by human dignity as con-
straint, it is accepted that there is a duty to respect a set of values
encapsulated by the notion of human dignity. In this sense,
then, it is true that human dignity is important only so long as it
is accepted as such; and, indeed, there could be fundamental
conversions as communities switch their dignitarian belief sys-
tems. For our purposes, though, this is not a line of inquiry that
need be pursued any further. It is enough to recognise that the
two cultures of human dignity might converge from time to time,
that there might be occasional concords, and that on practical
bioethics they are not always destined to disagree. Having said
this, the underlying differences between these approaches puts
them on a course for conflict and it is this potential for disagree-
ment that makes the emergence of the dignitarian alliance a sig-
nificant event for bioethical debates.
F. Taking Stock
Briefly, let us take stock by putting these rival views about
human dignity back into the larger picture. As indicated in my
introductory remarks, current thinking in bioethics is dominated
by three broad perspectives. These are:
* utilitarian cost/benefit thinking;
" the human rights perspective (grounded on human dig-
nity and emphasising the importance of individual auton-
omy and choice); and
" various rights-restricting, duty-based, appeals to human
dignity (as articulated by a "new dignitarian" alliance,
especially so in Europe).
To the extent that the recent reassertion of the importance of
respect for human dignity is simply a more pronounced articula-
tion of the basis of human rights (as seems to be the case with
human dignity as empowerment), bioethics remains a straight
contest between the utilitarian and human rights perspectives.
However, to the extent that a new dignitarian alliance is forming
around the idea of the duty not to compromise human dignity,
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an important new perspective is brought into play. Moreover,
this third perspective creates a genuinely triangular contest
because it is as much opposed to utilitarian consequentialism as
it is to the prioritisation of individual autonomy. It is against this
setting that we can turn to the debate about the law and ethics
concerning human embryonic stem cell research.
II. HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS
Great claims are being made for the therapeutic and drug
development potential of human embryonic stem cells (hES
cells) and their derivatives. We are told that we are standing on
the cusp of a medical revolution-if only the law will permit the
necessary research on human embryos to be carried out.
Recently, the law relating to embryo research in the United King-
dom has been widened precisely in order to allow for hES cell
research to be licensed. This extension of the law invites criti-
cisms from most other parts of Europe and from many corners of
the world. It has even been said by Lord Alton, one of the lead-
ing opponents of embryo research in England, that "it is impossi-
ble not to compare the seriousness with which cloning has been
confronted in the USA with the shoddy efforts to allow it in by
the back door in our country."4 So, how did the United King-
dom arrive at its present regulatory position and does it have an
ethically defensible view? In particular, how can it defend itself
against the charge that the destruction of human embryos is
unethical?
We can deal with these questions in five stages. First, the
regulatory scene in the United Kingdom needs to be sketched,
before going on to describe how the law has been extended.
This will take us to the principal objections argued against
extending the law, one of which is the fundamental ethical objec-
tion (that it is wrong to destroy an embryo) upon which we can
then focus. Finally, we can review the position taken by the
Select Committee with regard to this vexed ethical question.
A. Setting the Scene
The regulatory story begins in the United Kingdom with the
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology (the Warnock Report).41 Controversially, War-
nock took the view that research on human embryos was morally
permissible; and some members of the Committee (in fact, just a
40. Lord Alton, Immoral and Misguided, HoUSE MAG.,June 17, 2002, at 21.
41. 1984, Cmnd. 9314.
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majority) were prepared, even then, to sanction the creation of
embryos for research. However, as a counterweight, it was
emphasised that the human embryo has a special status and
should not be regarded as simply a ball of cells.
Despite considerable Parliamentary unease about licensing
research on human embryos, the Government took forward the
main thrust of Warnock's recommendations by enacting the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.42 The governing
policy underlying the legislation is that, if embryos are to be avail-
able for research, it is better to regulate such research openly
and effectively. This demands that the legislation declares quite
explicitly (for the guidance of scientists and funders as well as for
the re-assurance of the public) what is lawful and what is not; and
it calls for a dedicated regulatory body (the HFEA) to license and
monitor such research. So far as research on embryos is con-
cerned, the three central principles are:
" that the HFEA should license such work only if it is neces-
sary (the necessity principle);43
" that, if the HFEA is satisfied that such research is necessary
(because it cannot be done in any other way), then a
licence should be granted only if the particular activity is
judged to be necessary or desirable in relation to one of
the approved statutory purposes (this principle involves a
sense of proportionality and good purpose);44 and
42. 1990, c. 37, sched. 2 (Eng.). During the period between Warnock
and the 1990 Act, attempts were made to prohibit all embryo research, includ-
ing Enoch Powell's Unborn Children (Protection) Bill in 1985. See ROBERT G.
LEE & DEREK MORGAN, HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY. REGULATING
THE REPRODUCrIE REVOLUTION 57 (2001).
43. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, sched. 2
(Eng.).
44. Id. 3(2). Compare Press Dossier, European Group on Ethics in Sci-
ence and New Technologies, Adoption of the Opinion on Ethical Aspects of
Human Stem Cell Research and Use 2.7 (Paris, November 14, 2000) (revised,
January 2001).
In the opinion of the Group, in such a highly sensitive matter, the pro-
portionality principle and a precautionary approach must be applied: it is
not sufficient to consider the legitimacy of the pursued aim of alleviat-
ing human sufferings, it is also essential to consider the means
employed. In particular, the hopes of regenerative medicine are still
very speculative and debated among scientists. Calling for prudence,
the Group considers that, at present, the creation of embryos by somatic cell
nuclear transfer for research on stem cell therapy would be premature, since
there is a wide field of research to be carried out with alternative
sources of human stem cells (from spare embryos, foetal tissues and
adult stem cells).
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* that, in no circumstances, should research on embryos
run beyond 14 days or the appearance of the primitive
streak.45
In the 1990 legislation, five purposes are listed as approved.46
These are:
(a) promoting advances in the treatment of infertility,
(b) increasing knowledge about the causes of congenital
disease,
(c) increasing knowledge about the causes of miscarriages,
(d) developing more effective techniques for contracep-
tion, [or]
(e) developing methods for detecting the presence of gene
or chromosome abnormalities in embryos before
implantation.
The Act also provides that research may be licensed "for such
other purposes as may be specified in regulations."47 However,
this enabling provision is limited: the said "other purposes" must
be designed to "increase knowledge about the creation and
development of embryos, or about disease, or enable such knowl-
edge to be applied."4
B. Extending the Purposes
Because the five approved purposes in the 1990 legislation
are mainly concerned with research that is aimed at improving
(or disimproving) the chances of successful reproduction, they
are too narrow to support the range of ends now contemplated
by stem cell researchers. Accordingly, following a period of con-
sultation,49 the Government decided to extend the purposes in
order to open the way for stem cell research to deliver on its
apparent potential.
There were two ways in which the Government might have
sought to extend the purposes: (i) by issuing Regulations draw-
ing on the enabling provisions in the 1990 Act or (ii) by drafting
a bespoke statutory amendment to the 1990 Act. Opening itself
to Lord Alton's accusation of legislating through the back door,
45. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, § 3, 3(3) (a)-3(4).
46. Id., sched. 2, 3(2)(a)-(e).
47. Id. 3(2).
48. Id. 1 3(3).
49. See HFEA AND HUMAN GENETICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING ISSUES IN
REPRODUCTION, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE (1998), available at http://www.doh.gov.
uk (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); see also
U.K. DEP'T OF HEALTH, STEM CELL RESEARCH: MEDICAL PROGRESS WITH REsPONSI-
BILITY (2000), available at http://www.doh.gov.uk/stemcellreport.pdf (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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the Government chose the first of these options. The new Regu-
lations, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Pur-
poses) Regulations 2001,50 virtually "copy out" the terms of the
enabling provisions adding the following three new purposes to
the original five:
(a) increasing knowledge about the development of
embryos,
(b) increasing knowledge about serious disease, or
(c) enabling any such knowledge to be applied in develop-
ing treatments for serious disease.
Coming to these Regulations without any explanation, one would
be unlikely to appreciate that they were designed to facilitate
stem cell research, nor would it be apparent that licences for
embryonic research using cell nuclear replacement (CNR) tech-
niques might be approved under these purposes. 51 Parliamen-
tarians, however, were fully apprised as to the significance of
these Regulations. 52  A lengthy, and extremely high quality
debate ensued, particularly so in the Upper House where the
debate on the Regulations ran for some seven hours and
involved over forty speakers. On one side, Lord Alton and his
supporters proposed that the Regulations should be rejected
50. (2001) SI 2001/188. When asked to justify the use of regulations
rather than primary legislation, Yvette Cooper (the Parliamentary Under-Secre-
tary of State for Health) simply responded that the 1990 Act gave the Govern-
ment the power to extend the approved purposes by regulation. 356 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2000) 1176.
51. Cell nuclear replacement (CNR), or somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SNT), involves introducing the nucleus from an adult cell into an enucleated
egg. The engineered egg, retaining its own mitochondrial DNA but otherwise
drawing its DNA from the inserted nucleus, is then electronically stimulated to
develop into a CNR-embryo.
52. See, e.g., 621 H.L.JOUR. 16-17 (Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200001 /ldhansrd/voOl 0122/ text/ 0 122-04.
htm#10122-04_head2 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy). Lord Hunt, introducing the debate on the Regulations in the
House of Lords, said:
The principle and law that were established in the 1990 Act are clear.
Embryo research may be allowed now, but only for conditions such as
infertility, contraception and congenital disease, including cystic fibro-
sis and haemophilia. The question before the House today is whether
those purposes should be extended to include serious diseases such as
Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, cancer and diabetes-a pro-
vision anticipated and included as a regulation-making power in the
1990 Act.
That question arises because the late 1990s saw developments in cell
nuclear replacement technology in animals and because of the
announcement in the US of the extraction of stem cells from a human
embryo.
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until a Select Committee had the opportunity to examine the
implications of what was now being brought forward. This
amendment was defeated and, in the event, a compromise pro-
posed by Lord Walton was accepted. Under this amendment,
the Regulations were approved but a Select Committee was set
up to consider their implications. When the Select Committee
reported, it endorsed the spirit and intent of the new purposes.
Almost at once the HFEA began to issue licences under the new
purposes and funding bodies announced that money for hES cell
research would now be released.53
C. The Principal Objections
The debate in the House of Lords foreshadowed the princi-
pal objections to the Regulations that were to be rehearsed in the
voluminous evidence taken by the Select Committee. Essentially,
there are four recurring objections: one scientific, one ethical,
one practical, and one legal. Of these objections, it is the ethical
one in which we are most keenly interested; and, indeed, the
force of this objection is such that it can easily operate as an
undercurrent in relation to the other objections. Quite simply,
the ethical objection is that it cannot be right to destroy an
embryo; and, concomitantly, those who purport to "respect" the
embryo or take account of its "special status" while licensing its
destruction do not understand the import of their own ethical
commitments. Before focusing on this ethical question, we can
rehearse very briefly the other objections.
First, the scientific objection. During the House of Lords'
debate on the Regulations, it was forcibly suggested that new
research was coming through to challenge the ruling view that
adult stem cells have a relatively limited and specialised range.
And, as the Select Committee sat, evidence was regularly
adduced to add plausibility to the possibility that adult stem cells
might be much more plastic than is generally assumed.54 Never-
theless, the scientific evidence presented to the Committee
(including evidence from a number of leading international
adult stem cell researchers)5 5 overwhelmingly supported a "dual
track" complementary approach to stem cell research, with work
being conducted on both adult and hES cells.5 6 Given the regu-
53. James Meek, Millions In Grants For Embryo Stem Cell Research, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 28, 2002, at 2.
54. See Memorandum from Dr. Elizabeth Allan, STEM CELL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 306.
55. STEM CELL REPORT, supra note 10, 3.20.
56. Id. 3.16.
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latory framework for embryo research in the United Kingdom, if
the proponents of one-track adult stem cell work are right, it will
soon become clear that research on embryos is unnecessary and
the HFEA will decline to issue licences for such hES cell
research. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Committee concluded
that, whilst recent research on adult stem cells looks promising
and should be strongly encouraged by funding bodies and Gov-
ernment, the dual track approach is essential if maximum medi-
cal benefit is to be obtained."
Secondly, there is the practical concern that new purpose
embryo research will lead to reproductive human cloning. The
fear here arose from the possibility that the HFEA would draw on
the new purposes to license CNR in order to create customised
embryos.58 Such research, if successful, would improve our
understanding of what happens when an adult nucleus is placed
in an enucleated egg and apparently returns to an embryonic
state as well as aiding the development of so-called therapeutic
cloning techniques and therapies delivered by this route. How-
ever, in its early stages, CNR is common to both non-reproduc-
tive (therapeutic) and reproductive cloning. In practice, it
would be difficult to control the spread of this knowledge and
prevent it from falling into the hands of scientists who might be
tempted to implant CNR embryos and go on to attempt human
reproductive cloning. During the Summer recess in 2001, this
concern was significantly inflamed by the various declarations of
intent issued by the Italian embryologist, Professor Severino Anti-
nori, who is seemingly determined to be the first person to
reproductively clone a human being.5 9
At the same time that Professor Antinori was in the head-
lines, a judicial review brought by the Pro-Life Alliance was wait-
ing to be heard. Essentially, the purpose of the application was
to question the regulatory jurisdiction of the HFEA in relation to
CNR. At first instance the Alliance succeeded in its claim, the
effect of the decision being that CNR work fell outwith the juris-
diction of the HFEA and, in effect, was entirely unregulated.6 °
57. Id. 3.22.
58. Since the 1990 Act has been in force, a mere 118 embryos have been
specially created for research (as against more than 50,000 donated from IVF
programmes). See id. 4.26. It is quite likely that, with the new purposes now in
play, considerably more embryos, including CNR-embryos, will be specially cre-
ated for research.
59. See, e.g., Julian Borger, Maverick Scientists Promise A Human Clone,
GuARDIA.N, Aug. 8, 2001, at 1.
60. R. (Quintavalle) v. Sec'y of State for Health, 2001 WL 1347031. The
Government was successful in its appeal. R. (Quintavalle) v. Sec'y of State for
Health, [2002] Q.B. 628 (Eng. C.A.). Judgment was given shortly before the
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Professor Antinori, encouraged (paradoxically) by the Alliance's
initial success, issued further declarations of intent involving his
operation coming to England. The Government, on the back
foot and perceiving a cloning crisis, rushed through the Human
Reproductive Cloning Act 2001,6" under which it is now a crimi-
nal offence to place in a woman "a human embryo which has
been created otherwise than by fertilisation. 6 2
This hardly assuages all practical concerns, for regulation,
whether local or global, can only go so far. A number of points
might be pleaded by way of practical reassurance-in particular,
that cloning technology is still very primitive (even if Dolly is a
story of success, by and large, the story of reproductive cloning in
animals is one of massive failure) and that the demand for
human eggs far outstrips supply. We might also remind our-
selves that peer pressure within the scientific community will
make life relatively difficult for would-be human reproductive
cloners and that funding for such research is unlikely to be forth-
coming from the principal backers of CNR-based work. Having
said this, however, one suspects nevertheless that somewhere,
some day, a cloned child will be born.6" But, of course, whether
or not we regard this as an occasion for slippery slope regret
rather depends on the ethical view that we take.
Thirdly, there were a number of legal objections, largely
boiling down to the claim that the Regulations were ultra vires
relative to the enabling provisions in the 1990 Act. Certainly, the
Select Committee reported. However, after the publication of the Stem Cell
Report, the Alliance obtained leave for a final appeal to the House of Lords.
61. The Bill was introduced a mere six days after the High Court decision
and it became law about two weeks later.
62. Human Reproductive Cloning Act, 2001, c.23, § 1 (1) (Eng.). The Act,
which comprises just two sections, does not define "fertilisation" but, presuma-
bly, it means human sperm fertilisation of a human egg.
63. We might recall the remarks of the United States Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980):
The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put
an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount
of research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure
knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that leg-
islative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific
mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could
command the tides.
Id. at 317.
To similar effect, see the remarks by Yvette Cooper, Hansard (HG) Nov. 17,
2000, Col 1230. And, indeed, Professor Antinori has recently claimed that one
of the women in his programme is eight weeks pregnant with a cloned embryo.
See Tim Radford, Italian Promises Cloned Human Baby in Januay, GUARDIAN, Nov.
28, 2002, at 14; James Meek, Woman 'Expecting First Cloned Baby', GUARtAN, Apr.
6, 2002, at 1.
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Regulations are much less transparent than they should be.
However, these are somewhat ephemeral points6 4 and we do not
need to pursue them here. Suffice it to say that, as with the other
objections, we need to be aware that what are ostensibly legal
objections are sometimes, in reality, the surface articulations of
deeper ethical concerns. We can debate the science, the practi-
calities and the law all day; but, in most cases, we cannot resolve
our disagreements because they originate from fundamentally
opposed ethical perspectives. It is in this context of deep division
that the triangular nature of the emergent bioethics can assist
our understanding of where the disagreements really lie and
why.
D. The Ethical Objection
The fundamental ethical objection is that the creation or
use of embryos for research is wrong and their destruction
indefensible. This implies two things: first, that embryos have
moral status; and, secondly, that in a moral calculation we must
appreciate that we violate the protected interests of embryos by
deploying them for research or destroying them. Of these two
points, the first is critical; for, if this does not hold, the objection
does not get to first base and it can only apply in an attenuated
form.
The idea of a moral position (formally conceived) is not
entirely unproblematic. However, most accounts of the moral
standpoint include as one of its features that moral reason
involves a commitment to recognising and respecting the legiti-
mate interests of others. This leaves an awful lot to be argued
about but at least, in moral reason, "others" do count. However,
one of the key points for clarification is who counts as an "other,"
or who has moral status? Each of the three main constituencies
in current bioethical debate has its own distinctive line on this
question.
Utilitarians, as I have said, come in several varieties. Some
emphasise the minimisation of distress or pain and suffering,
others the maximisation of pleasure or welfare, yet others the
optimisation of preferences, and so on. The particular emphasis
will determine the criterion for having moral status, whether it
be the capacity to suffer, to experience pleasure, or to have a
preference. The most inclusive view is probably one that makes
the capacity to suffer distress the test for moral status. Non-
human animals qualify on this criterion as, of course, do
64. For discussion, see Roger Brownsword, Stem Cells, Superman, and the
Report of the Select Committee, 65 MOD. L. REv. 568, 579-82 (2002).
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humans. Even a human fetus might be included. However, the
human embryo, lacking such a capacity a few days after fertilisa-
tion does not qualify. On the utilitarian view, therefore, the
embryo does not itself have interests and, to this extent, it is no
different from pebbles on a beach. We should not think,
though, that this necessarily means that damage to the embryo
can be left out of the moral calculation. If some persons are
themselves distressed by the thought that embryos are to be com-
mitted for research and destroyed, this counts against embryo
research-in just the way that it would count against the destruc-
tion of Stonehenge that some persons would be distressed at the
prospect of the ancient stones (and all that they symbolise) being
destroyed.
If we turn to the perspective of human dignity as empower-
ment, we are looking for capacities that mark out one as a bearer
(or operator) of human rights. Coming from this perspective, it
is often said that non-human animals cannot have rights because
they cannot respond to duties; but, equally, it might be said that
this is so because they cannot insist upon or waive the perform-
ance of a (claim) right or exercise a permission or an option.6 5
Whichever way one looks at it, whether from the right or the duty
side, the minimum requirement for moral status is that one can
actively participate in a community regulated by respect for
human rights. In short, one must have the capacity for making
one's own choices and formulating one's own purposes in just
the way celebrated by this understanding of human dignity.
There is undoubtedly a tension between the logic of this view,
which restricts moral status to agents, and the jurisprudence of
human rights, which allows moral status to all born members of
the human species.66 Afortiori, there would be a tension between
the logic of this view and any claim that an embryo has moral
status. Unless we are to abandon reason, however, we cannot dis-
place logic whenever it generates results that create difficulties.
Like utilitarianism, therefore, human dignity as empowerment
denies that the embryo has moral status. Also like utilitarianism,
65. It might also be said that operators of rights and duties, qua moral
agents, will understand the nature of moral principles and restraints. As Carl
Cohen puts it:
To be a moral agent is to be able to grasp the generality of moral
restrictions on our will. Humans understand that some acts may be in
our interest and yet must not be willed because they are simply wrong.
This capacity for moral judgment does not arise in the animal world;
rats can neither exercise nor respond to moral claims.
CARL COHEN & TOM REGAN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE 35 (2001).
66. This is a tension that Cohen tries to avoid. However, Regan sees the
fallacy of division being committed here. Id. at 277-79.
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however, this is not necessarily the end of the story. For, there
may be indirect arguments that operate to protect the embryo.
The third perspective, human dignity as constraint, is per-
fectly straightforward. The human embryo is to be directly
respected. It matters not that it cannot experience distress or
make its own choices. It is not like a rock or a stone. It is a living
thing and a member of the human species. As such, it is pro-
tected by the overarching value of respect for human dignity. It
has moral status and to treat it like a rock or a stone is to compro-
mise human dignity. So contends the dignitarian alliance.
In the light of these rival views about moral status, what can
we say about those proponents of embryo research who say that it
is permissible to destroy embryos. for research but who also insist
that we must respect the embryo or recognise its special status? It
is clear enough what respect for persons means in utilitarian and
human rights perspectives, but what does it mean when we are
dealing with a living thing that lacks moral status? According to
Karen Lebacqz:
Researchers show respect towards autonomous persons by
engaging in careful practices of informed consent. They
show respect toward sentient beings by limiting pain and
fear. They can show respect toward early embryonic tissue
by engaging in careful practices of research ethics that
involve weighing the necessity of using this tissue, limiting
the way it is to be handled and even spoken about, and
honoring its potential to become a human person by
choosing life over death where possible.67
This is a brave attempt to translate respect for human embryos
into a reluctance to treat embryos as research objects coupled
with a recognition that this is a potential person. But, so long as
we are eschewing the direct protective argument of human dig-
nity as constraint, how can we render such a version of respect
plausible? In other words, what kind of contingent considera-
tions might be drawn into the utilitarian and human rights
perspectives?
First, as indicated already, negative utilitarians seek to mini-
mise the sum total of distress. Whether the source of my distress
is what I regard as inappropriate action in relation to myself, or
in relation to others, it matters not. Nor does it matter that the
"others" in relation to whom I am experiencing distress would
not themselves figure directly in a utilitarian calculation. The
crucial fact is that I do count; I am distressed; and this must be
67. Karen Lebacqz, On the Elusive Nature of Respect, in THE HuMAN EMBRY-
ONIC STEM CELL DEBATE 149, 160 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001).
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weighed. What this amounts to, therefore, is that utilitarians
must respect the attitudes of its membership insofar as they hold
negative views about embryo research. However, if we have no
qualms about embryo research, and if there are no other nega-
tive utilities to be detected, we would have no problem with
proceeding.
Secondly, in some contexts, the consequences of treating a
human embryo as if it were no more than a rock or a stone might
be damaging to the way in which we respond to the claims made
by those who do have moral status. In other words, utilitarians
might be concerned that lack of respect for human embryos
tends towards lack of respect for those who are sentient; and
rights theorists might worry that lack of respect for human
embryos tends towards a weakening of respect for the entitle-
ments of rights-holders. The fact that, in both utilitarian and
human rights theories, there is a clear distinction between those,
such as the human embryo, who do not have moral status and
those who do is neither here nor there. If there is a reasonable
belief that lack of concern for the one might lead to lack of
respect for the other, there is a reason for acting with restraint in
relation to human embryos.
Thirdly, there is the potentiality of the human embryo, men-
tioned by Lebacqz and argued about interminably in relation to
both embryos and fetuses. On the one side, it is argued that
potentiality is not actuality, that acorns are not yet oaks any more
than students are already graduates or embryos already fetuses,
let alone born humans. From this it follows that whatever respect
or recognition attaches to actual or achieved status cannot be
read across to those still in the category of potentiality; and, thus,
there is no reason why potential humans, merely by virtue of
their potentiality, should be treated as though they are already
actual humans. To this the standard riposte is that we are deal-
ing here, not with potentiality at large, but specifically with
potential human life-and, this we are led to believe, is a special
case. Clearly, this exchange is stuck in the mire. On the one side
(the latter side as presented above), the potential for human life,
the "radical" potential, is seen as giving the embryo moral sta-
tus. 68 It is not a matter of treating the embryo "as if" it had moral
status; quite simply, it already has what it takes to be accorded
moral status in its own right. Such is the position struck by those
who subscribe to human dignity as constraint. On the other side,
whether under utilitarianism or under human dignity as empow-
68. See, e.g., John Keown, Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law
after Bland, 113 L.Q. RE,. 481 (1997).
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erment, a more restrictive view of moral status is being taken.
The embryo does not qualify and the question is why potential
qualification should be treated as sufficient. From utilitarian and
human rights perspectives, therefore, potentiality is a poor argu-
ment for moral status (which, itself, does not hinge on the poten-
tial for human life). Nevertheless, from such perspectives, is
there anything more that can be said about potentiality as a con-
tingent consideration?
The potentiality of the human embryo might figure as a fac-
tor in indirectly protective arguments of the kind already
sketched. Over and above such considerations, the potentiality
of the embryo might be linked into a precautionary approach
that results in a degree of protection. In the case of utilitarian-
ism, the relevant threshold is sentience. Quite where this thresh-
old lies is moot. However, if there is any risk of inadvertently
crossing the line, the utilitarian may think it right to err on the
side of caution. By drawing the line on embryo research at four-
teen days, the utilitarian might judge that English law takes an
excessively cautious approach. Nevertheless, the fact that the
embryo (all being well) is on the way to becoming a being with
moral status must generate some caution unless we are entirely
confident about the point at which that status is achieved. In the
case of human dignity as empowerment, the human rights stan-
dard for moral status is so far beyond the level of development
achieved by the embryo that potentiality coupled with precaution
seemingly adds little to the argument for protection. Indeed, on
this approach to potentiality, the logic of human rights based on
human dignity as empowerment is that it is not until we are deal-
ing with children that we approach the threshold for moral sta-
tus. There is, however, a more systematically precautionary line
of argument. We make certain assumptions about the level of
development and capacities achieved by the embryo, the fetus,
the young child, the teenager, the adult and so on. We make
these assumptions in good faith and, provided that our particular
assumptions about the embryo are correct, its potentiality for fur-
ther development offers no argument against using it for
research. However, what if our assumptions are wrong? Speaking
of potentiality, we might be (we have the potential to be) wrong.
If we take this thought seriously, we need to move carefully
reminding ourselves, in the case of human embryos, that this
might just be one who has moral status. In other words, precau-
tion dictates that we operate in terms of possible and probable
agents; and, within such a framework, the potentiality of the
human embryo indicates that it (in contrast to rocks and stones)
is at least a possible agent.
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In the light of these comments, we can consider how the
Select Committee tackled the objection, strenuously put to it by a
number of witnesses, that research on human embryos is, quite
simply, unethical; added to which any talk of "respect for the
embryo" by those who are licensing the creation and use of
human embryos for research is incoherent nonsense.
E. The Select Committee's Response to the Ethical Objection
Let us be clear about the ethical objection. In its stronger
form, the objection has it that the use of human embryos for
research is unjustifiable and should be prohibited. On this view,
hES cell research, whatever its supposed benefits, is categorically
wrong. In its weaker form, the objection is that supporters of
embryo research cannot have it both ways; that is to say, they
cannot claim that they respect the embryo (or recognise its spe-
cial status) and, at the same time, claim that the creation or use
of human embryos for research is justifiable-in other words, the
weaker objection challenges the coherence of a position such as
that taken by Warnock. What did the Select Committee have to
say on these matters?
With regard to the objection in its stronger form, opponents
of human embryo research can find significant support in Article
18 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine which,
inter alia, categorically prohibits the creation of human embryos
for research; and they can argue from the importance of human
dignity (as constraint) which underpins Article 18. However,
given that the United Kingdom has not yet committed itself to
the Convention and (in view of the permissive state of its law)
would have considerable difficulty in complying with the Conven-
tion, the Select Committee does not press for a fundamental
change in policy.69 As for arguments based explicitly on respect
for human dignity, although the Select Committee notes that
appeals to this idea increasingly feature in international
frameworks designed to set ethical limits for science and
medicine, they effectively reject it as an elusive notion which falls
short of offering practical guidance when the aim of the exercise
is to set limits to permissible research on human embryos.7
From the perspective of human dignity as constraint, the Com-
69. But cf. HuMAN GENETICS COMM'N, INSIDE INFORMATION: BALANCING
THE INTERESTS IN THE USE OF PERSONAL GENETIC DATA (2002) (urging the Gov-
ernment to sign and ratify the Convention).
70. STEM CELL REPORT, supra note 10, 7.3-7.7. Interestingly, whilst the
Committee fully supports the ban on reproductive human cloning in the
Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001, it does not rest on human dignity-
rather it is the risk of physical abnormality coupled with the ambiguity of a
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mittee's thinking is unconvincing because this interpretation of
human dignity actually gives perfectly clear and precise practical
guidance as to the limits of permissible research on human
embryos-quite simply, no such research is permissible. What
the Committee's dismissive discussion signals, therefore, is that
human dignity as constraint is not its starting point.
In fact, the Committee's starting point is to accept the essen-
tial position struck by Warnock and enshrined in the 1990 legisla-
tion. This not only serves to shut out human dignity as
constraint, it excludes any serious engagement with the ethical
objection in its stronger form and leads fairly rapidly to the Com-
mittee's central conclusion which it expresses as follows:
Whilst respecting the deeply held views of those who
regard any research involving the destruction of a human
embryo as wrong and having weighed the ethical argu-
ments carefully, the Committee is not persuaded, espe-
cially in the context of current law and social attitudes, that
all research on human embryos should be prohibited.7'
Unpacking this conclusion, the Committee is accepting not sim-
ply that the United Kingdom is a pluralistic society but that mor-
alists hold very different views about the status of the embryo
and, concomitantly, whether it has rights or protectable interests
or whether it represents a protectable good, and so on. As with
the abortion debate, where proponents of choice can respect
that rival proponents of life are arguing from a moral viewpoint,
and vice versa, there can be mutual respect between moralists
who debate the legitimacy of conducting research on human
embryos. 72 The differences, however, are irreconcilable and a
public position has to be taken-which, for the Committee, signi-
fies going with Warnock and the subsequent accretion of permis-
sive regulation and social acceptance thereof.73
cloned child's relationship with its parents that troubles the Committee. Id.
5.21 and Appx. 6.
71. Id. 4.21.
72. Compare the strategy in RONALD DWORKIN, Lira's DOMINION: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993).
73. It should be said that where it is already accepted that there will be
surplus embryos from IVF programmes, and that these embryos will have to be
destroyed, it is but a short step to accept their commitment to research. This
kind of pragmatism is bluntly put in EMILYJACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION
(2001): "If the disposal of spare embryos is inevitable, it is difficult to see why
washing an embryo down the drain would be morally preferable to using it in
order to carry out valuable research." Id. at 230. See, too, the views put to the
Select Committee on behalf of the Office of the Chief Rabbi, by Dayan Cha-
noch Ehrentreu, Memorandu by the Board for Social Responsibility of the
Church of England, Office of Chief Rabbi and the Linacre Centre for Health-
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Although it would have been startling, indeed, if the Select
Committee had concluded that, current law and social attitudes
notwithstanding, research on human embryos can in no circum-
stances be justified, this is precisely what the stronger ethical
objection holds. For those who hold this view, premised on
human dignity as constraint, the Committee's "respect" for its
position barely compensates for the Committee having side-
stepped the issue by favouring consistency with present practice
over a fundamental re-evaluation of that practice. More impor-
tantly, though, if the Committee avoids engaging with the
stronger ethical objection by rehearsing the position attacked by
the weaker objection, what sense does the Committee give to its
commitment to respect the special status of the human embryo?
As a measure of its respect for the human embryo, the Com-
mittee endorses the current fourteen day limit for embryo
research,". it underlines the sensitivity that is required where
human tissue is handled,75 and it argues that embryos, whether
standard or CNR, "should not be created specifically for research
purposes unless there is a demonstrable and exceptional need
which cannot be met by the use of surplus embryos."76 The
Report also makes a pair of mutually reinforcing recommenda-
tions the aim of which is to minimise the use of embryos in
research, namely: (i) that, where the HFEA grants licences for
hES cell research, it should impose a condition requiring that
any ES cell line generated in the course of the research should
be deposited in a national cell bank; coupled with (ii) that,
before granting any new licence for hES cell line research, the
HFEA should be satisfied that no suitable cell lines are already
available in the cell bank. 7 What are we to make of these conces-
sions to the embryo?
From a utilitarian perspective, the fourteen-day limit, as we
have remarked, might seem a touch over-cautious-the embryo
surely is still some way from being sentient. Nevertheless, if such
a restriction serves to maintain public confidence in the integrity
of embryo research and its regulation, this may well be a benefit
care Ethics 11 162, 173, 189 (July 9, 2001), available at http://www.chiefrabbi.
org/articles/other/stemcell2.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
Of course, some may resist this pragmatic step, sensing that there is an impor-
tant difference between creating embryos for reproductive purposes and using
them for research. However, it is not obvious how such a position can be coher-
ently placed within a utilitarian or rights perspective.
74. STEM CELL REPORT, supra note 10, 4.22.
75. Id. 4.25.
76. Id. 1 4.28 (standard embryos); Id. 5.14 (CNR embryos).
77. Id. 8.29.
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worth taking. From a rights perspective, the attachment to a
fourteen-day limit has no clear rationale. Even on a precaution-
ary approach, the possibility that the embryo is already an agent
does not markedly alter at this stage of what we understand to be
its developmental path.
Why should the Committee emphasise the need for human
tissue to be handled sensitively? At least three considerations
spring to mind. First, the insensitive handling of such material
can cause offence-one only has to recall the notorious Kelly
case 78 where removed body parts were incorporated in so-called
works of art. From a utilitarian standpoint, there is good reason
to avoid occasioning such gratuitous distress. Secondly, if the
way in which the tissue is handled deviates from the expectations
of the donors, this will be a matter that concerns rights theorists
(who will detect departures from the terms of the consent
given) 79 but also to utilitarians who will fear that bad publicity
might interfere with the donation of embryos needed for utility-
yielding research. Thirdly, insofar as the tissue contains informa-
tion about the genetic make-up of any individuals who do have
moral status, then both utilitarians and rights theorists will be
concerned, the former about the consequential disutility and the
latter about breaches of privacy and confidentiality.
The Committee also insists that embryos should not be spe-
cifically created for research if surplus embryos are available and
fit for the purpose; and it endorses the necessity principle written
into the 1990 legislative framework. This amounts to the follow-
ing two principles: (1) surplus human embryos are not to be
used for research unless it is necessary (unless, in effect, the
research cannot be carried out using animals); and (2) human
embryos are not to be specifically created and used for research
unless the research cannot be carried out using surplus embryos.
But, why worry most about the creation of human embryos, then
about the use of surplus human embryos, and least of all about
non-human animals? Why this order of protective priorities?
From a rights perspective, it is difficult to see the sense of favour-
ing research on, say, developed chimpanzees rather than on
78. R. v. Kelly, 2 W.L.R. 384 (Eng. C.A. 1998).
79. Compare Loane Skene, Proprietary Rights in Human Bodies, Body Parts
and Tissue: Regulatory Contexts and Proposals for New Laws, 22 LEGAL STUDIES 102,
117-18 (2002), for the proposal that there should be a personal, but not a
proprietary, right to permit our bodies, body parts, and tissue to be used for,
inter alia, medical or scientific research. Consent for such use may be subject to
express or implied conditions. Where conditions of this kind are flouted by
researchers (or other recipients), it is suggested that, in principle, damages
should be available. Id. at 123.
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human embryos; and, unless "wasting" surplus embryos has some
indirect impact on the protection and promotion of rights, there
is no reason to prefer their use to the use of specially created
human embryos. To the champions of utilitarian bioethics, such
as Peter Singer, it will be unclear why the Committee should be
more comfortable with the use of non-human animals than
human embryos that are anyway destined for destruction-
indeed, this might strike utilitarians as the latest manifestation of
speciesism. By contrast, the preference for the use of surplus
human embryos over specially created embryos might make good
sense. After all, if resources have to be invested in the produc-
tion of human embryos, then there is a good economic argu-
ment for making use of those embryos that are already available.
And, similar thoughts would apply to the Committee's recom-
mendations that are designed to minimise the commitment of
further human embryos to research if researchers could make do
without investing in further human embryos. Utilitarians might
also pause over the Committee's implicit judgment that animal
research, although increasingly controversial and politicised, is
less problematic (relative to utilitarian criteria) than research on
surplus human embryos; and that the latter is more likely to be
accepted than ready use of specially created human embryos.
Finally, it is worth observing that, although the Committee is
strongly opposed to those who are sources of human embryos
treating their embryos as commodities to be sold, it does not
relate its view on this matter to the question of respect for the
human embryo. s ° Yet, it would have been perfectly plausible to
have identified a stand against commodification as one aspect of
the respect due to human embryos. Or, at any rate, this would
have been a natural move to be made by a Committee guided by
the perspective of human dignity as constraint. That the Com-
mittee was not so guided is overwhelmingly clear. And, its
remarks on respect for human embryos fit best with a utilitarian
bioethics shaped by a political sense of how far and how fast the
public would be prepared to go with the latest technology.
CONCLUSION
What should we conclude about the shape of bioethics today
and, particularly, the emergence of the dignitarian alliance? For
some bioethicists, the rediscovery of the value (or virtue) of
human dignity is a cause for concern. According, for instance, to
Helga Kuhse:
80. See STEM CELL REPORT, supra note 10, 8.32.
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[TI he notion of human dignity plays a very dubious role in
contemporary bioethical discourse. It is a slippery and
inherently speciesist notion, it has a tendency to stifle argu-
ment and debate and encourages the drawing of moral
boundaries in the wrong places. Even if the notion could
have some use as a short-hand version to express principles
such as "respect for persons", or "respect for autonomy", it
might, given its history and the undoubtedly long-lasting
connotations accompanying it, be better if it were for once
and for all purged from bioethical discourse. 8 '
Many (including the Select Committee) would agree with Kuhse
that human dignity is a slippery idea best avoided by utilitarians;
and, if we favour a human rights perspective (backed by human
dignity as empowerment), we might be alarmed that the found-
ing idea of human rights is being adopted to gather together the
quite different agenda of the dignitarian alliance. The fact of the
matter is, however, that human dignity is an extremely powerful
idea and it is likely to seem even more important as technology
races ahead to redefine what we hitherto took to be the limits of
human finitude. In a rapidly changing world, driven by the bio-
sciences backed by an optimistic utilitarian bioethics, the
demand that human dignity be respected is an essential counter-
weight. However, what we are looking for is not dignitarian
dogma but a rationally defensible conception of human dignity
as the basis on which human rights and human virtue are
founded. 2 To this extent, the approach of human dignity as
81. Helga Kuhse, Is There a Tension Between Autonomy and Dignity ?, in Bio-
ETHICS AND BioLAW VOLUME II: FOUR ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 61, 74 (Peter Kemp et
al. eds., 2000).
82. In this paper, I have said little about human dignity as a virtue. How-
ever, the virtue of living with dignity, as exemplified by the likes of Socrates and
Nelson Mandela, is hard to deny. There is a positive to be accentuated here
and, in a brave new genetic world, living with dignity might prove to be a virtue
of the first importance. Compare FUKUYAMA, supra note 36, at 173, who, having
opposed utilitarian thinking on a number of familiar grounds, adds the follow-
ing objection:
The utilitarian goal of minimizing suffering is itself very problematic.
No one can make a brief in favor of pain and suffering, but the fact of
the matter is that what we consider to be the highest and most admira-
ble human qualities, both in ourselves and in others, are often related
to the way that we react to, confront, overcome, and frequently suc-
cumb to pain, suffering, and death. In the absence of these human
evils there would be no sympathy, compassion, courage, heroism, soli-
darity, or strength of character. A person who has not confronted suf-
fering or death has no depth. Our ability to experience these
emotions is what connects us potentially to all other human beings,
both living and dead.
BIOETHICS TODAY, BIOETHICS TOMORROW
empowerment is on the right track; but a complete account of
the way in which individual responsibility is immanent (perhaps,
surprisingly so) within an autonomy-centred ethics placed in a
context of vulnerable agency has yet to be written.8 3 This, I sug-
gest, is one of the major tasks for tomorrow's bioethics.
Id.
We might say that, in the absence of these negative features of the human con-
dition, there would be little opportunity for the virtue of human dignity to
develop.
83. This is a project on which Deryck Beyleveld and I have made a start in
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